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[ Crim. No. 8312. In Bank. Oct. 20, 1965.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RONALD 
HOWARD POLK and GEORGE ANTHONY GREGG, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
[1] Criminal Law-Evidence-Confessions-Admissibility. - Con-
fessions are inadmissible if they were obtained when the in-
vestigation was no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved 
crime but had begun to focus on a particular suspect who was 
in custody, the authorities had carried out a process of inter-
rogations that lent itself to eliciting incriminating statements, 
but had not effectively informed defendant of his right to 
counselor of his absolute right to remain silent, and no evi-
dence established that he waived such rights. 
[2a, 2b] Id.-Appeal-ReversibleError-Evidence-Confessions.-
Defendants' confessions were improperly admitted into evi-
dence at their trial on the issue of guilt and at their second 
penalty trial where they were obtained after defendants' 
arrest and during several months of persistent police interroga-
tion designed to elicit incriminating statements about many 
crimes, without advising defendants of their rights to counsel 
and to remain silent. 
[3] Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel.-When officers arrest 
a suspect and undertake a process of interrogations that lends 
itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the accusatory 
or critical stage has been reached and the suspect is entitled 
to counsel. 
[4] Id.-Judgment--CoUateral Attack.-On appeal from judgments 
entered after a second penalty trial, defendants could success-
fully attack the judgments on the issue of guilt on the ground 
that confessions obtained without first advising them of their 
rights to counsel and to remain silent had been erroneously 
admitted in evidence during the guilt trial where, within the 
90 days after affirmance on appeal of the guilt judgments in 
which defendants could have applied to the U.S. Supreme Court 
for certiorari, that court decided the case establishing the 
[1) See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 422; Am.Jur., Evidence (1st ed 
§ 478). 
[3] See Cal.Jut,2d, Criminal Law, § 146 et seq.; Am.Jur.2d, 
Criminal Law, § 309 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1) Criminal Law, § 464; [2,5] Criminal 
Law, § 1382(27); [3] Criminal Law, ~ 107; [4] Criminal Law, 
§ 1019; [6] Criminal Law, §448.5; [7, 11-14) Criminal Law, 
§ 1011.1; [8] Criminal Law, §482; [9] Homicide, §§ 118, 120; 
[10] Criminal Law, § 632. 
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constitutional rights on which defendants based their col-
lateral attack, so that the guilt judgments had not become 
final before such decision. 
[5] Id.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Evidence-Confessions.-The 
erroneous admission at the guilt trial and the second penalty 
trial of confessions elicited from defendants without first 
advising them of their rights to counsel and to remain silent 
was prejudicial, though defendants took the stand and testified 
to committing the same acts described in their confessions, 
where, since defendants had no evidence but their own testi-
mony to present on their own behalf and failure to take the 
stand would have made guilty verdicts certain after intro-
duction of the confessions, defendants were impelled by the 
erroneous admission of the confessions to take the stand and 
again confess, hoping for a verdict finding them guilty of a 
lesser offense, and where some of the extrajudicial confessions 
were more prejudicial to defendants than their trial testi-
mony. 
[6] Id. - Evidence - Admissions to Prosecutor's Agent.-On the 
penalty phase of a first degree murder trial, a psychiatrist's 
testimony describing defendants' admissions to her should have 
been excluded where she interviewed each defendant twice at 
th.e request of the prosecutor's office, thus making her an agent 
of the prosecution with no more right than any such agent 
to elicit admissions from defendants not informed of their 
rights to counsel and to remain silent. 
[7] Id.-Procedure for Determining Penalty-Evidence.-On the 
second trial of the penalty phase of a first degree murder trial, 
defendants' testimony at the trial on the issue of guilt should 
not have been read into evidence where such testimony was 
impelled by the erroneous introduction into evidence at the 
guilt trial of confessions obtained from defendants without 
first advising them of their rights to counsel and to remain 
silent. 
[8] Id. - Evidence - Testimony From Former Penalty Trial.-
Where defendants' testimony at their second penalty trial was 
impelled, at least in part, by the admission of evidence ob-
tained in violation of their constitutional rights to counsel 
and to remain silent, such testimony will be inadmissible at a 
subsequent guilt trial following reversal in their entirety of 
judgments of convictions imposing death penalties. 
[9] Homicide+-Evidence-Photographs: Demonstrative Evidence. 
-In a murder case, it was not an abuse of discretion to allow 
the introduction in evidenqe of a photograph depicting the 
victim's body and of the victim's bloody undershorts where the 
danger of prejudice to defendants did not outweigh the proba-
tive value of the evidence, and the most inflammatory photo-
graphs were properly excluded. 
-
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[10] Criminal Law - Conduct of Counsel- Argument - Penalty 
Phase of Case.-On the penalty phase of a first degree murder 
case, the trial court correctly ruled improper the prosecutor's 
argument that unless the death penalty were imposed de-
fendants, already subject to a life tenn as a result of other 
convictions, would get a "free ride" for the killing of their 
victim and for other crimes. 
[11] Id. - Procedure for Determining Penalty - Instructions. -
Where evidence of other crimes was introduced on the penalty 
phase of a first degree murder trial, an instruction that other 
crimes introduced in evidence must be proved beyond a reason-
able doubt should have been given. 
[12] Id.-Procedure for Determining Penalty-Instructions.-On 
the penalty phase of a first degree murder trial, it is not com-
pulsory for the trial court to instruct on the legal considera-
tions that the jury should take into account when deciding 
whether the penalty should be death or life imprisonment. 
[13] Id.-Procedure for Determining Penalty-Instructions.-On 
the penalty phase of a first degree murder case, the court may 
properly aid the jury by stating in the instructions the kinds 
of factors that may be considered, thereby setting the tone for 
the jury's deliberation. 
[14] Id. - Procedure for Determining Penalty - Instructions. -
Though an instruction that the jury cannot be influenced by 
pity or sympathy for defendant is appropriate on the issue 
of defendant's guilt of murder, such an instruction improperly 
eliminates factors that a jury may consider in fixing the 
punishment on the penalty phase of the trial. 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b» from judgments of the Superior Court of Tulare 
County. John Locke, Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for murder and conspiracy to commit kidnaping 
for robbery. Judgments of conviction imposing death pen-
alties, after retrial of the murder penalty issue only, reversed 
in their entirety solely on the constitutional ground announced 
in People V. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 
P.2d 361J. 
Claude O. Allen and Chris G. Gasparich, under appoint-
ment by the Suprezpe Court, for Defendants and Appellants . 
. Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, As-
SIstant Attorney General, and Edsel W. Haws, Deputy At-
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TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendants were convicted of con-
spiracy to commit kidnaping for the purpose of robbery (Pen. 
Code, §§ 182, 209) and of the first degree murder of William 
Fambro (Pen. Code, § 189). The jury fixed the penalty at 
death on the murder count, and defendants were sentenced 
to prison for the term prescribed by law on the lddnaping 
count and to death on the murder count. On appeal, the 
judgments were reversed for a new penalty trial only. (People 
v. Polk, 61 Ca1.2d 217, 234 [37 Cal.Rptr. 753,390 P.2d 641].) 
Upon retrial, the jury again fixed the penalty for each de-
fendant at death. This appeal is automatic. (Pen. Code, 
§ 1239, subd. (b).) 
The essential facts are set forth in our former opinion 
and need not be repeated. (People v. Polk, 61 Cal.2d 217 
[37 Cal.Rptr. 753, 390 P.2d 641].) 
At the second trial on the issue of penalty, there was also 
evidence that Polk admitted complicity in the killing of a gas 
station attendant, Raymond Sweet, on March 17, 1962, and, 
with Jesse Ferguson, in kicking to death in Los Angeles on 
April 10, 1962, a skid row inhabitant called" The Hook." 
Defendants were arrested in Los Angeles on May 20, 1962. 
The police began to question them on the day they were 
arrested and continued to do so for several months thereafter. 
They obtained numerous confessions concerning the murder of 
Fambro and other incidents of the alleged conspiracy. One 
officer estimated that he talked to defendant Gregg 20 times 
and to defendant Polk 10 times. At the trial on the issue of 
guilt, transcripts of some of these statements, tape recordings 
of some, and police testimony describing others were admitted 
into evidence against both defendants. At the second penalty 
trial, a tape recording of one of Gregg's confessions, police 
testimony describing some of his other confessions, and police 
testimony describing Polk's confession of other crimes were 
admitted into evidence. Their testimony at the trial on the 
i"sue of guilt was also read into evidence. 
[1] Confessions are inadmissible if they were obtained 
when" (1) the investigation was no longer a general inquiry 
into an unsolved crime but had begun to focus on a particular 
suspect, (2) ~the suspect was in custody, (3) the authorities 
had carried out a process of interrogations that lent itself 
to eliciting incriminating statements, (4) the authorities had 
not effectively informed defendant of his right to counselor of 
his absolute right to remain silent, and no evidence establishes 
that he waived these rights." (People v. Dorado, 62 Ca1.2d 
338, 353 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361] ; Escobedo v. Illi-
..• ~ 
.J 
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nois, 378 U.S. 478 [84 S.Ot. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977].) [2a] The 
confessions were admitted into evidence at the trial on the 
issue of guilt and at the second penalty trial in violation of 
this rule. 
All the confessions admitted into evidence were made after 
defendants had been arrested. All were obtained during 
several months of persistent police interrogation designed 
to elicit incriminating statements about many crimes. 
[3] "["\Vlhen the officers have arrested the suspect and the 
officers have undertaken a process of interrogations that lends 
itself to eliciting incriminating statements, tbe accusatory or 
critical stage has been reached and the suspect is entitled to 
counsel." (People v. Stewart, 62 Cal.2d 571, 577 [43 Cal. 
Rptr. 201, 400 P.2d 97).) The first confession regarding the 
Fambro murder, the tape recording of defendant Gregg on 
June 2, begins: "George, in your own words . . . tell us as 
you told us before exactly wbat happened pertaining to tbis 
sailor boy." Similarly, Sergeant Brooks testified that de-
fendant Polk's first statement about the killing of "The 
Hook" was obtained. as follows: "I told him we were pretty 
sure that Jesse Ferguson had been involved and I was fairly 
certain that he was with Jesse when 'The Hook' was killed, 
and 1 asked if he was, and he said, 'Yes.' " 
[2b] There is no evidence that defendants were at any 
time advised of their right to counselor of their absolute 
right to remain silent, and we cannot presume that they were 
so advised. (People v. Stewart, supra, 62 Cal.2d 571, 581.) 
Accordingly, all the confessions should have been excluded. 
(People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338,353 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 
P.2d 361].) 
[4] The Attorney General contends that the judgment on 
the issue of guilt was final before the decision in Escobedo v. 
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977], thereby 
precluding reversal on the grounds of that decision. (I",. re 
Lopez, 62 Ca1.2d 368, 376 [42 Cal.Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 380].) 
There is no merit in this contention. The judgment on the 
issue of guilt was affirmed on March 31, 1964. (People v. 
Polk, 61 Cal.2d 217 [37 Cal.Rptr. 753, 390 P.2d 641].) With-
in the 90. days thereafter in which defendants could have ap-
plied for certiorari (see 28 U.S.C. § 2101 (d); rule 22, Rules 
of the United States Supz:eme Court), on June 22, 1964, the 
United States Supreme Court decided the Escobed.o case. 
Thus the judgment on the issue of guilt was not final at the 
time of Escobedo, since the United States Supreme Court has 
stated that "by final we mean where the judgment of con-
._) 
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viction was rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, 
and the time for petition for certiorari had elapsed . . . ." 
(Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622, fn. 5 [85 S.Ot. 
1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601].) In the Linkletter case, when faced 
with the retroactivity of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 [81 S.Ot. 
1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 84 A.L.R.2d 933], the United States 
Supreme Court made clear that judgments not final at the 
time of the Mapp decision were reviewable by a writ of habeas 
corpus. Accordingly, federal habeas corpus will also be avail-
able to review judgments not final at the time of the Escobedo 
decision that are attacked on the basis of the rule in that case. 
(See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 [83 S.Ot. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 
837J.) As we pointed out in In re Spencer, ante,pp. 400, 
405, 406 [46 Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33J, "Whether or not 
we are compelled to afford defendants a comparable state col-
lateral remedy (see Case v. Nebraska (1965) 381 U.S. 336 
[85 8.Ct. 1486,14 L.Ed.2d 422J ; Henry v. Mississippi, supra, 
379 U.S. 443 [85 S.Ot. 564, 13L.Ed.2d 408J; In re Shipp 
(1965) 62 Cal.2d 547, 554, fn. 2 [43 Cal.Rptr. 3, 399 P.2d 571]; 
76 Harv.L.Rev. (1963) 1253, 1269), the availability of the 
federal remedy makes it pointless for us to refuse to do so, 
when, as in this case, defendant is entitled to a new trial on the 
issue of penalty. Moreover, the grant of state collateral relief in 
these circumstances accords with our traditional habeas corpus 
rules. This court normally affords collateral relief on constitu-
tional grounds if the petitioner had no opportunity to raise the 
constitutional issue at trial and on appeal. (See In re Dixon 
(1953) 41 Ca1.2d 756, 760-761 [264 P.2d 513]; In re Shipp, 
supra, 62 Ca1.2d 547, 551-553.) Petitioner had no such oppor-
tunity when, as in this case, the new constitutional right had 
not been declared at those times. (See People v. H~1lery (1965) 
62 Oa1.2d 692, 711-712 [44 Cal.Rptr. 30, 401 P.2d 382]; People 
v. Kitchens (1956) 46 Oal.2d 260, 262.263 [294 P.2d 17].)" 
The attael;: on the judgments on the issue of guilt on this 
appeal from the judgments on the issue of penalty is compar-
able to a collateral attack, thereby requiring us to follow our 
practice on collateral attack by granting relief. 
[5J There is no merit in the Attorney General's conten-
tion that even if the confessions were admitted in violation 
of Escobedo, their admission was not prejudicial since defend-
ants took the stand and testified to committing the same acts 
described in their confessions. When defendants testified, the 
only substantial evidence connecting them with the Fambro 
murder, for which the jury fixed the penalty at death, was 
their inadmissible extrajudicial confessions and admiRQjnml 
\ 
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The defendants had no evidence but their own testimony to 
present on their own behalf. Thus their failure to take the 
stand would have made verdicts of guilty certain after the 
prosecution's introduction of the numerous confessions. De-
fendants therefore took the stand and again confessed, pre-
sumably hoping that the jury would find them guilty of a 
lesser offense than first degree murder. Thus, their testimony 
was impelled by the erroneous admission of the confessions 
and cannot be segregated therefrom to sustain the judgment. 
(Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 91-92 [84 S.Ct. 229, 11 
L.Ed.2d 171 J ; People v. Davis, 62 Cal.2d 791, 796 [44 Cal. 
Rptr. 454, 402 P.2d 142J; People v. Dixon, 46 Ca1.2d 456, 
458 [296 P.2d 557] ; People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal.2d 460, 463 [34 
Cal.Rptr. 863, 386 P.2d 487J; see also People v. Mickelson, 
59 Cal.2d 448, 449 [30 Cal.Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658J.) More-
over, some of the extrajudicial confessions were more preju-
dicial to the defendants than their trial testimony. Thus, in 
the tape recording of defendant Gregg's first statement, he 
confessed to a more active role in the Fambro killing than 
he admitted at the trial. The prejudicial effect of the ad-
mission of this tape recording is emphasized by the fact that 
at the second penalty trial the jury returned to the court-
room and requested that the instructions be given again, that 
Gregg's tape-recorded statement be replayed, and that parts 
of his testimony be reread. 
Since the violations of Escobedo affected the whole trial, the 
judgments on both the conspiracy and murder counts must be 
reversed. 
Other questions remain that may arise on retrial. 
[6] At the trial on the issue of penalty, the testimony 
of the psychiatrist describing defendants' admissions to her 
and defendants' testimony at the trial on the issue of guilt 
that was read into evidence should also have been excluded. 
The psychiatrist interviewed each defendant twice at the 
request of the district attorney's office. She was thus an agent 
of the prosecution with no more right than any such agent 
to elicit admissions from defendants without their being in-
formed of their rights. (See People v. Quinn, 61 Ca1.2d 551 
[39 Cal.Rptr. 393, 393 P.2d 705].) The admissions of guilt of 
numerous crimes made to the psychiatrist should therefore 
have been excluded. (People v. Dorado, 62 Ca1.2d 338, 353 
(42 Cal.Rptr.169, 398 P.2d 3~1].) 
[7] Defendants' testimony at the trial on the issue of guilt 
was read into evidence in the second penalty trial. That testi-
63 C.2d-15 
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mony was impelled by the erroneous admission of the con-
fessions. (People v. Davis, supra, 62 Ca1.2d 791, 796.) Con-
sequently, the testimony was inadmissible at any future trial 
and should have been excluded. [8] Similarly, defendants' 
testimony at the second penalty trial will be inadmissible here-
after. That testimony also was impelled, at least in part, by 
the admission of evidence obtained in violation of Escobedo. 
[9] Defendants contend that the introduction of a photo-
graph depicting Fambro's body lying in the grass at the bot-
tom of an embankment and of the victim's bloody undershorts 
was prejudicial. The introduction of this evidence would be 
prejudicial if the danger of prejudice to the defendant out-
weighed its probative value. (People v. Henderson, 60 Ca1.2d 
482,495 [35 Cal.Rptr. 77, 386 P.2d 677].) The most inflam-
matory photographs were properly excluded, and the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the remain-
ing photographs and the undershorts were not unduly preju-
dicial. (People v. Arguello, 61 Ca1.2d 210, 213 [37 Cal.Rptr. 
601, 390 P.2d 377] ; People v. Lindsey, 56 Ca1.2d 324, 328 [14 
Cal.Rptr. 678, 363 P.2d 910].) 
[10] At the second penalty trial, the district attorney 
argued to the jury that unless the death sentence was imposed, 
the defendants would get a "free ride" for the killing of 
Fambro and for other crimes. The trial court correctly ruled 
that such an argument is improper. "The district attorney 
... improperly discredited the Adult Authority by arguing 
that a life sentence for the murder would not increase defend-
ant's punishment since he already was subject to a life term 
as the result of [other crimes], when it is clear that the sen-
tencing authority would consider a first degree murder as a 
factor toward increase of the length of the total prison term." 
(People v. Treloar, 61 Cal.2d 544, 549 [39 Cal.Rptr. 386, 393 
P.2d 698].) 
[11] Defendants contend that since evidence of other 
crimes was introduced at the trial on the issue of penalty, an 
instruction that such crimes must be proved beyond a reason-
able doubt should have been given. We agree with this con-
tention. Generally, the standard of competency of the evi-
dence at the trial on the issue of penalty is the same as the 
standard 'required at the trial on the issue of guilt. (People 
v. Hamilton, 60 Ca1.2d 105, 129 [32 Cal.Rptr. 4, 383 P.2d 
412].) Since evidence of other crimes, however, may have a 
particularly damaging impact on the jury's determination 
whether the defendant should be executed, we recognized in 
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390 P.2d 381], that there should be an exception to the normal 
standard of proof at the trial on the issue of penalty (People 
Y. Pltrvis, 56 Ca1.2d 93, 95 [13 Cal.Rptr. 801, 362 P.2d 713]). 
Thus, even though at the trial on the issue of guilt the jury 
must only be convinced that it is more probable than not 
that the defendant committed other crimes before it may con-
sider them (People v. Albertson, 23 Ca1.2d 550, 579, 581 [145 
P.2d 7]), at the trial on the issue of penalty they must be 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. 
[12] Finally, defendants contend that the trial court must 
instruct on the legal considerations that the jury should take 
into account when deciding whether the penalty should be 
death or life imprisonment. We do not agree that such an 
instruction is compUlsory. The Legislature has entrusted to the 
absolute discretion of the jury the awesome decision between 
life imprisonment and the death penalty in first degree 
murder cases. (Pen. Code, § 190; People v. Green, 47 CaL2d 
209,218 [302 P.2d 307].) The Legislature has thus indicated 
its belief that jurors understand the factors that are relevant 
to such a decision. Recitation of such factors by the trial 
court is therefore not essentiaL [13] The trial court, may, 
however, properly aid the jury by stating the kinds of factors 
that may be considered, thereby setting the tone for the jury's 
deliberation. (See People v. Friend, 47 Ca1.2d 749, 767-768 
[306 P.2d 463] ; Model Penal Code, § 210.6 (Proposed Official 
Draft 1962).) [14] In this case, the trial court erroneously 
instructed that the jury cannot be influenced by "pity for the 
defendant" or "sympathy" for him. (CALJIC No.1.) Al-
though appropriate on the issue of guilt, this instruction 
improperly eliminates factors that a jury may consider in 
fixing the punishment. (See People v. Friend, supra, 47 Ca1.2d 
749,767-768.) 
Since other questions raised are not likely to arise on retrial, 
we nced not decide them here. 
The remittitur in People v. Ronald Howard Polk and George 
Anthony Gregg, Crim. No. 7356, 61 Cal.2d 217 [37 Cal.Rptr. 
753, 390 P.2d 641], is recalled and the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of March 31, 1964, vacated as to defendants 
Polk and Gregg. The judgments appealed from are reversed 
in their entirety. 
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Pe~k, J., concurred. 
BURKE, J.-I dissent. As noted in the opinion affirming 
the judgments of guilt at the first trial (People v. Polk, 61 
452 PEOPLE V. WILLIAMS [63 C.2d 
Cal.2d 217, 220 [37 Cal.Rptr. 753, 390 P.2d 641]), "The 
evidence establishes the perpetration of a series of brutal 
crimes-kidnapings, assaults with a deadly weapon, armed 
robberies, and murder with mutilation of the victim-com-
mitted in concert by these defendants .... " I am of the opin-
ion after "an examination of the entire cause, including the 
evidence" (as mandated by § 4%, art. VI, of the Cal. Const.), 
that it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable 
to defendants Polk and Gregg would have been reached in the 
absence of the errors noted in the opinion of the majority. I 
would affirm the judgments appealed from in their entirety. 
McComb, J., and Schauer, J.,. concurred. 
